Disclaimer: This is a research paper I wrote for my History of Argentina class at BYU. It isn't something that everyone is going to agree with, but it was a good opportunity to stretch my research and writing skills. I hope it provides a valuable and different point of view on a part of Argentine history.
Julio A.
Roca and The Conquest of the Desert
By Bradley
Gregory
Written
Fall 2010
The
Conquest of the Desert was a military campaign against the Indians in the
Argentine pampas from 1878-1879 lead by General Julio A. Roca. Many scholars debate about whether his
campaign against the Indians was beneficial or destructive to the Argentine
identity. Speaking to his fellow
countrymen Roca argued that, “our self-respect as a virile people obliges us to
put down as soon as possible, by reason or by force, this handful of savages
who destroy our wealth and prevent us from definitively occupying, in the name
of the law, progress and our own security, the richest and most fertile lands
of the Republic.”[1] According to Hinton, the previous statement
about the Conquest of the Desert is placed in the context that Roca committed
genocide against the Indians. Understanding
the motives of Roca’s strategy behind the conquest and the benefits that arose
because of it, it becomes clear that in spite of the minimal tragedies and
losses, the conquest was a success and lead to greater economic and territorial
growth in Argentina.
For decades
the Argentine nation had been trying to solve the so called “Indian
problem”. From the days of Juan Manuel
de Rosas to the late 1870’s the nation had failed to solve this “problem”. During Avellaneda’s presidency there were
frequent Indian raids along the southern national borders of Argentina. These raids “limited the field of agriculture
and cattle of the inhabitants of the country” furthermore, “The cattle ranches
and outposts . . . suffered the raids periodically, with its following loss of
precious lives, the degrading captivity of women, the looting of towns and the
theft on the ranches”.[2] These raids and lootings of the Indians were
common place for decades.
President Avellaneda
tried to combat these raids and lootings upon entering his presidency in 1874. He entrusted his Minister of War Dr. Adolfo
Alsina to study the problem. Alsina
planned to send five commands throughout the Pampas, Neuquén Cordillera, and Rio Negro.[3] He commenced his plans and had various successes
advancing the border to Carhue, Guamini, Puan, Trenque Lauquen and other
cities. He also marched toward Azul with
various triumphs over Cacique Indians like Namuncura, Catriel and Pincen. Due to Alsina’s unexpected death in December
of 1877, President Avellaneda placed the responsibility of continuing with the
conquest on the shoulders of Julio A. Roca.
Roca differed from Alsina however in how to carry out the conquest. Roca’s idea was to get the Conquest done quickly
and to go on the offensive by a series of invested raids rather than the
defensive like Alsina. He committed to himself,
to the government, and to the country that he would complete the conquest in
two years.[4] In conquering the desert quickly and in the
offensive way done by Roca, some scholars feel it was good and brought much to
the Argentine nation, and some feel it was unbeneficial and even harmful.
According to Bustos-Videla the conquest provided a great opportunity for Catholic priests to
venture in places they otherwise would not have been able too. In venturing with the commands these priests
were then able to convert and civilize the Indian savages. Safety was also provided to them in not
having to worry about Indian raids while in any given town. Having this safety with them aloud them to
establish many schools, libraries and churches.[5]
In addition
to the religious benefits of the conquest, the dissertation of Richard O. Perry
gives great personal insight of the Indian culture on the pampas and gives good
reasoning as to why they were feared by the Argentines. In contrast, by having such detailed
information of the culture, cultural losses are seen more clearly as a result
of the deaths and relocation of the Indians due to the conquest.[6]
The
compilation done by Cristina San Roman provides living documents of
correspondence letters written by various leaders such as Roca, Bernardo de
Irigoyen, and Alsina; all key leaders of the conquest. The conquest strategy of Roca is clearly
depicted in his letter to Alsina in which he objects to the strategy plan of
Alsina and gives his own input on how it should be done.
Furthermore,
Roca’s strong character is captured by Felix Luna. Luna makes a free re-creation of the life of
Roca within a rigorous historical context. The words he puts into the mouth of
Roca are based on “correspondence letters and other documents from his
authorship”.
Armando
Mendez confirms the strong character of Roca because he illustrates how Roca
dissented from Alsina’s plan to conquer.
Also relevant is the confirmation given by Mendez of the barbaric and
savage nature of the Indians.
In contrast
to the previously mentioned authors, Alexander Laban Hinton places the Conquest
of the Desert in the context of genocide.
Though only a brief mention is made of Roca in Hinton’s work, it
presents the argument that what Roca did was genocide like unto the westward
expansion during Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency in the United States. [7]
In contrast
of these authors, what will be added in this paper will show the genocide
aspect and how Roca in reality contributed to the Argentine nation building by
expulsing the Indians from the pampas to the other side of the Rio Negro.
Roca’s motives
for his strategy are seen clearly in various correspondence letters written by Bernardo
de Irigoyen to the Chilean National Congress, Alsina to Roca, and Roca to
Alsina and President Avellaneda. Irigoyen,
the minister of foreign affairs, notes in a letter written to the National Congress
that the Indians raided the Argentine borders and stole cattle to then
illegally sell them to Chile.[8] He writes,
”The government of Chile can’t ignore that in the
foothills of the Andes, to the south of the slab, there lives only a few hordes
of savages encouraged by the reported trade, that dedicate themselves to
pillaging our borders; and Chile can’t ignore that every introduction at those
heights is proceeded by the thefts of the Indians and they are frequently
accompanied by other crimes…”[9]
Illegal
correspondence between the Indians and the Chileans created more friction
between the two nations. The border
disputes made it more logical to conquer the Patagonia so as to secure an
extended border, and acquire rich fertile lands.
In
Alsina’s plan, the nation would build a trench to divide the savages from the
border towns of Argentina. This in Roca’s
opinion was like waiting for the Indians to come to them, constantly
threatening the towns, the Indians having the upper hand. He writes to President Avellaneda that the Indian’s
population is insignificant to what the nation has to offer them. They have only primitive lances and as a
defense they only disperse. He
continues, “We have six thousand soldiers armed with the latest modern inventions
and yet we allow them to have the initiative of war… remaining as cowards
against a handful of barbarians”.[10] By being on the offensive and gaining ground
to the Rio Negro, they could then use that great river as a natural barrier
that is deeper than the man made trenches and of less cost to the national
treasury as well. Having control of the
river would bring a great economic advantage to Argentina; it would make
colonizing a lot easier due to the river being so navigable. Metal of all types could be brought and
transported, mainly “copper gold and coal”.
Even having 15,000 leagues of land for the people and productive work,
the value would grow to an insurmountable worth.[11]
In
a letter written to Alsina about Alsina’s strategy of the conquest, Roca
explains that by using forts and getting closer to the towns, the Indians will
become stirred and will take advantage even by just creating alarm. If all the commands worked by getting closer
to the Indian populations through using forts all along the borders, this would
eventually create an inevitable war with all the tribes.[12]
Roca’s
reasoning behind the conquest and how it was to be done can be supported by his
patriotism and motivated character. Roca
only had the nation’s best interest in mind.
His patriotism is painted well in his desire to reach Choele Choel (the
end of his campaign) by the 25 of May, the celebrated day of the First National
Government of the father land. In Roca’s
words “We were giving the father land 500,000 kilometers for its birthday so
that in that enormous extension it could grow”.[13] His command reached Choele Choel as scheduled
and did not waste time. A commentator of
the day described Roca as being all “calculation, reflection, thorough analysis
of the pros and cons”.[14] He had the right character to carry the
conquest out quickly and efficiently for the benefit of the Argentine people.
The
Indians tragedies from the conquest can be seen in the lifestyle they lived. The Indians in the pampas were mainly
Aracaunian, centered on Mapuche culture and language. These Indians were highly
skilled at horse riding, even comparable to the gauchos. Many European travelers marveled at the skill
the Indians had at training and disciplining the horses to be far superior to Argentines
horses. Though the Indians’ horses came
from the same plains as the Argentines, the Indians’ horses had more strength
and durability because they were put through more rigorous training than the
Argentine horses.[15] These Indians were admired for their discipline
and skill in training the horses. They
had a beautiful culture that centered on the horse; the horse being the reason
that drew the Indians to the Pampas in the first place. Though not all of the
Indian population was destroyed in the conquest perhaps a great majority of
this culture was lost in relocating the Indians to Buenos Aires and other
reserves. The Indians that fought
against the commands were highly skilled in riding but their riding skills did
not keep them from being captured or killed.
Total numbers resulted in 1600 either killed or made prisoner, and
around 10,000 were forced to turn themselves in.[16]
Due
to Roca being as calculative and analytical as he was, the casualties resulted
in a minimum on both sides; the Indians and the soldiers. In fact, lives were even saved thanks to the
campaign. In fact, at the end of Roca’s
first phase of the conquest, which consisted of scouting out the land with a
few attacks, there were 300 captives that were rescued.[17] This was only one of the many benefactors of
the conquest.
Having
a natural barrier between the Indians meant less insecurity about Indian raids
on the border towns. Cattle would be
safe from theft, and as a result there would be no illegal commerce with Chile. What also stopped the illegal commerce from
continuing was the strengthened border of the Andes between Argentina and
Chile.
Security
of the border towns was now sure. The decade’s
long war with the Indians was finally over.
The fact that it was carried out with so little
apparent effort and such trifling losses does not minimize the importance of
the accomplishment, but simply shows that it was so carefully planned as to
work to perfection. The saving of life
and the rapidity of accomplishment were not owing to the simplicity of the
problem but to the care with which each detail had been thought out and
planned. To General Roca belongs the
lion’s share of the credit for working out these details.[18]
With
the accomplishment of expulsing the Indians to the other side of the Rio Negro,
there was an added 15,000 square leagues of land with untold economic
potential. Immigration to Argentina
became more appealing. Great amounts of
land were sold for cheap prices attracting immigrants from Europe, Chile and
other adjacent countries. The Welsh for example were some of the first
to populate the Patagonia.
The land
was also distributed to the officials who took part in the campaign and also to
the Argentine citizens who were under terms to better
the land by building wells and cultivating it. [19] Land value rose quickly in
the coming years of cultivation.
Many of the
generals sold their distributed lands at a price value that they thought was a
good profit. The generals were
disappointed to learn that they sold prematurely when discovering that just a
couple decades later the land value was sometimes 250 times more than the
original value.[20]
The motives behind General Roca’s quick tactics to clear the desert were for
the benefit of the Argentine people. He
was not motivated by a desire to exterminate the Indian enemy but rather clear
the desert by pushing the Indians southward.
Roca even suggested to Alsina that they offer the main cacique Indians a
bought piece of land reserve to lure them out.[21]
Roca’s
meticulous plans had fruits of a quick campaign with minimal casualties on both
sides. Because of the success of the
campaign, land and territorial advantages were gained as a result with control
of the Rio Negro and Rio Colorado.
Rivers which helped in colonization and transportation to the western cordillera.
Economic growth was made sure with the acquiring of the rich fertile lands of
the Patagonia. The land would now be
fully utilized in the hands of a civilized and modern people.
The act of General Julio A. Roca in the Conquest of the Desert was not an
act of genocide but an act of building a nation. He made sure the security and economic growth
for all Argentine citizens.
Works Cited
Bustos-Videla,
César. “The 1879 Conquest of the
Argentine
Desert and Its Religious Aspects.” The
Americas 21 (1964).
Hasbrouck, Alfred.
“The Conquest of the Desert.” The Hispanic
American
Historical Review 15 (1935).
Hinton,
Alexander Laban. Annihilating Difference: the
Anthropology of Genocide. University
of California Press,
2002.
Luna,
Felix. Soy Roca. Buenos Aires,
Editorial Sudamericana,
1989.
Menendez,
Armando. Roca las dos presidencias.
Buenos Aires:
Compania Impresora Argentina S.A., August
1990.
Newton, Jorge. El General Roca Conquistador del Desierto. Buenos
Aires, Editorial Claridad, S. A., November
1966.
Perry,
Richard O. “The Argentine Frontier the
Conquest of The
Desert 1878-1879.” diss., Athens Georgia, 1971.
Roman,
Cristina San. Roca y su tiempo,
documentos vivos de
nuestro pasado, ed. Centro Editor de América Latina. Bs.
As.,
talleres de prensa medica, November 1983.
[1]
Alexander Laban Hinton, Annihilating difference:
the anthropology of genocide (University of California Press, 2002), 45.
[2] Armando Menendez, Roca las dos presidencias (Buenos Aires: Compania Impresora
Argentina S.A., August 1990), 13.
[3] César Bustos-Videla, “The 1879 Conquest of
the Argentine ‘Desert’ and Its Religious Aspects,” The Americas 21 (1964): 42.
[4]
Menendez, Roca las dos presidencias, 13-14. Alsina’s approach was to travel in jagged
lines and set up a defense system of deep trenches obtaining Indian zones
little by little. Roca however would be
on the offensive and finish within two years, one to plan and prepare and the
other to carry it out.
[6]
Richard O. Perry, “The Argentine
Frontier The Conquest of The Desert 1878-1879” (diss., Athens Georgia, 1971).
[8] Cristina San Román, Roca y su tiempo, Documentos vivos de
nuestro pasado, ed. Centro Editor de América Latina (Bs. As., talleres de
prensa medica, november 1983), 41-56.
[10]Ibid.,
55.
[14] Jorge Newton, El General Roca Conquistador del Desierto(Buenos Aires, Editorial
Claridad, S. A., November 1966), 41.
[18]
Alfred Hasbrouck, “The Conquest of the Desert,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 15(1935): 225.
[19]Ibid., 227.
[20]
Ibid., 227.
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